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During fiscal year 2018, many federal agencies were often not adequately or effectively implementing their information security policies and practices. For example, most of the 16 agencies GAO selected for review had deficiencies related to implementing the eight elements of an agency-wide information security program required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) (see figure) . Further, inspectors general (IGs) reported that 18 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 agencies did not have effective agency-wide information security programs. GAO and IGs have previously made numerous recommendations to agencies to address such deficiencies, but many of these recommendations remain unimplemented.Number of 16 Selected Agencies with Deficiencies in the Eight Elements of an Information Security Program, as Required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 With certain exceptions, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) were generally implementing their government-wide FISMA requirements, including issuing guidance and implementing programs that are intended to improve agencies' information security. However, OMB has not submitted its required FISMA report to Congress for fiscal year 2018 and has reduced the number of agencies at which it holds CyberStat meetings from 24 in fiscal year 2016 to three in fiscal year 2018—thereby restricting key activities for overseeing agencies' implementation of information security. Also, OMB, in collaboration with the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), did not include a metric for system security plans, one of the required information security program elements, in its guidance on FISMA reporting. As a result, oversight of agencies' information security programs was diminished. For 22 years, GAO has designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area. FISMA requires federal agencies to develop, document, and implement information security programs and have independent evaluations of those programs and practices. It also assigns government-wide responsibilities for information security to OMB, DHS, and NIST.FISMA includes a provision for GAO to periodically report to Congress on agencies' implementation of the act. GAO's objectives in this report were to (1) describe the reported adequacy and effectiveness of selected federal agencies' information security policies and practices and (2) evaluate the extent to which OMB, DHS, and NIST have implemented their government-wide FISMA requirements. GAO categorized information security deficiencies as reported by 16 randomly selected agencies and their IGs according to the elements of an information security program; evaluated IG reports for 24 CFO Act agencies; examined OMB, DHS, and NIST documents; and interviewed agency officials. GAO is making three recommendations to OMB to (1) submit its FISMA report to Congress for fiscal year 2018, (2) expand its coordination of CyberStat meetings with agencies, and (3) collaborate with CIGIE to update the inspector general FISMA reporting metrics to include assessing system security plans. OMB generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.For more information, contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Key practices for establishing an agency-wide cybersecurity risk management program include designating a cybersecurity risk executive, developing a risk management strategy and policies to facilitate risk-based decisions, assessing cyber risks to the agency, and establishing coordination with the agency's enterprise risk management (ERM) program. Although the 23 agencies GAO reviewed almost always designated a risk executive, they often did not fully incorporate other key practices in their programs:Twenty-two agencies established the role of cybersecurity risk executive, to provide agency-wide management and oversight of risk management.Sixteen agencies have not fully established a cybersecurity risk management strategy to delineate the boundaries for risk-based decisions.Seventeen agencies have not fully established agency- and system-level policies for assessing, responding to, and monitoring risk.Eleven agencies have not fully established a process for assessing agency-wide cybersecurity risks based on an aggregation of system-level risks.Thirteen agencies have not fully established a process for coordinating between their cybersecurity and ERM programs for managing all major risks.Until they address these practices, agencies will face an increased risk of cyber-based incidents that threaten national security and personal privacy.Agencies identified multiple challenges in establishing and implementing cybersecurity risk management programs (see table).Agency Challenges in Establishing Cybersecurity Risk Management Programs Challenge Agencies reporting challenge Hiring and retaining key cybersecurity management personnel 23 Managing competing priorities between operations and cybersecurity 19 Establishing and implementing consistent policies and procedures 18 Establishing and implementing standardized technology capabilities 18 Receiving quality risk data 18 Using federal cybersecurity risk management guidance 16 Developing an agency-wide risk management strategy 15 Incorporating cyber risks into enterprise risk management 14 Source: GAO analysis of agency data. | GAO-19-384In response to a May 2017 executive order, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identified areas for improvement in agencies' capabilities for managing cyber risks. Further, they have initiatives under way that should help address four of the challenges identified by agencies—hiring and retention, standardizing capabilities, receiving quality risk data, and using guidance. However, OMB and DHS did not establish initiatives to address the other challenges on managing conflicting priorities, establishing and implementing consistent policies, developing risk management strategies, and incorporating cyber risks into ERM. Without additional guidance or assistance to mitigate these challenges, agencies will likely continue to be hindered in managing cybersecurity risks. Federal agencies face a growing number of cyber threats to their systems and data. To protect against these threats, federal law and policies emphasize that agencies take a risk-based approach to cybersecurity by effectively identifying, prioritizing, and managing their cyber risks. In addition, OMB and DHS play important roles in overseeing and supporting agencies' cybersecurity risk management efforts.GAO was asked to review federal agencies' cybersecurity risk management programs. GAO examined (1) the extent to which agencies established key elements of a cybersecurity risk management program; (2) what challenges, if any, agencies identified in developing and implementing cybersecurity risk management programs; and (3) steps OMB and DHS have taken to meet their risk management responsibilities and address any challenges agencies face. To do this, GAO reviewed policies and procedures from 23 civilian Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 agencies and compared them to key federal cybersecurity risk management practices, obtained agencies' views on challenges they faced, identified and analyzed actions taken by OMB and DHS to determine whether they address agency challenges, and interviewed responsible agency officials. GAO is making 57 recommendations to the 23 agencies and one to OMB, in coordination with DHS, to assist agencies in addressing challenges. Seventeen agencies agreed with the recommendations, one partially agreed, and four, including OMB, did not state whether they agreed or disagreed. GAO continues to believe all its recommendations are warranted.For more information, contact Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

During its audit of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) fiscal years 2018 and 2017 financial statements, GAO identified new deficiencies in information system security controls that along with unresolved control deficiencies from prior audits collectively represent a significant deficiency in the agency's internal control over financial reporting systems. Specifically, GAO identified 14 new deficiencies in information system security controls over certain IRS financial and tax processing systems that are relevant to internal control over financial reporting. Of the 14 new deficiencies, eight were related to access controls, four were related to configuration management, one was related to segregation of duties, and one was related to contingency planning. In a separately issued LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY report, GAO communicated to IRS management detailed information regarding the 14 new information system security control deficiencies and made 20 recommendations to address them.In addition, GAO found that as of September 30, 2018, IRS had completed corrective actions to address information system security control deficiencies associated with 46 of the 154 recommendations resulting from GAO's financial audits, and as a result, these recommendations were closed. GAO closed one additional recommendation that was no longer relevant because of changes in the agency's operating environment. In the LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY report, GAO communicated to IRS management the status of previously reported recommendations as of September 30, 2018.As a result, IRS has 127 GAO recommendations to address—the 107 remaining open recommendations from GAO's prior financial audits and the 20 new recommendations GAO made in the LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY report. Until these new and continuing control deficiencies are fully addressed, IRS financial reporting and taxpayer data will remain unnecessarily vulnerable to inappropriate and undetected use, modification, or disclosure.Status of GAO Recommendations to IRS for Addressing Information System Security Control Deficiencies  Information system security control area Open recommendations from prior audits  Prior recommendations closed as of September 30, 2018 New recommendations resulting from FY 2018 audit Total  remaining open recommendations    Access controls 106 24 11 93 Configuration management 32 13 7 26 Segregation of duties 1 1 1 1 Contingency planning 2 2 1 1 Information security program 13 7 — 6 Total 154 47 20 127 Legend: FY = fiscal year; — = no recommendation made.Source: GAO analysis of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data.  |  GAO-19-474R This report presents the new information system security control deficiencies identified during GAO's audit of IRS's fiscal years 2018 and 2017 financial statements based on its fiscal year 2018 testing of controls over certain IRS financial and tax processing systems relevant to internal control over financial reporting. This report also includes the results of GAO's fiscal year 2018 follow-up on the status of IRS's corrective actions to address information system control deficiencies and associated recommendations contained in GAO's prior years' reports that were open at the beginning of GAO's fiscal year 2018 audit. In a separately issued LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY report, GAO made 20 recommendations to address the 14 new information system security control deficiencies related to access controls, configuration management, segregation of duties, and contingency planning. In commenting on a draft of the separately issued LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY report, IRS agreed with our recommendations and stated that it will ensure that its corrective actions include root cause analysis for sustainable fixes that implement appropriate security controls. GAO will evaluate the effectiveness of IRS's efforts to address these deficiencies during its audit of IRS's fiscal year 2019 financial statements.For more information, contact Cheryl E. Clark at (202) 512-9377 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or Nancy R. Kingsbury at (202) 512-2700 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Original release date: June 17, 2019

Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is issuing this Activity Alert to provide information on a vulnerability, known as “BlueKeep,” that exists in the following Microsoft Windows Operating Systems (OSs), including both 32- and 64-bit versions, as well as all Service Pack versions:

Windows 2000Windows VistaWindows XPWindows 7Windows Server 2003Windows Server 2003 R2Windows Server 2008Windows Server 2008 R2

An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system.     

Technical Details

BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) exists within the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) used by the Microsoft Windows OSs listed above. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform remote code execution on an unprotected system. 

According to Microsoft, an attacker can send specially crafted packets to one of these operating systems that has RDP enabled.[1] After successfully sending the packets, the attacker would have the ability to perform a number of actions: adding accounts with full user rights; viewing, changing, or deleting data; or installing programs. This exploit, which requires no user interaction, must occur before authentication to be successful.

BlueKeep is considered “wormable” because malware exploiting this vulnerability on a system could propagate to other vulnerable systems; thus, a BlueKeep exploit would be capable of rapidly spreading in a fashion similar to the WannaCry malware attacks of 2017.[2]

Original release date: June 17, 2019

Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is issuing this Activity Alert to provide information on a vulnerability, known as “BlueKeep,” that exists in the following Microsoft Windows Operating Systems (OSs), including both 32- and 64-bit versions, as well as all Service Pack versions:

Windows 2000Windows VistaWindows XPWindows 7Windows Server 2003Windows Server 2003 R2Windows Server 2008Windows Server 2008 R2

An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system.     

Technical Details

BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) exists within the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) used by the Microsoft Windows OSs listed above. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform remote code execution on an unprotected system. 

According to Microsoft, an attacker can send specially crafted packets to one of these operating systems that has RDP enabled.[1] After successfully sending the packets, the attacker would have the ability to perform a number of actions: adding accounts with full user rights; viewing, changing, or deleting data; or installing programs. This exploit, which requires no user interaction, must occur before authentication to be successful.

BlueKeep is considered “wormable” because malware exploiting this vulnerability on a system could propagate to other vulnerable systems; thus, a BlueKeep exploit would be capable of rapidly spreading in a fashion similar to the WannaCry malware attacks of 2017.[2]

Remote identity proofing is the process federal agencies and other entities use to verify that the individuals who apply online for benefits and services are who they claim to be. To perform remote identity proofing, agencies that GAO reviewed rely on consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) to conduct a procedure known as knowledge-based verification. This type of verification involves asking applicants seeking federal benefits or services personal questions derived from information found in their credit files, with the assumption that only the true owner of the identity would know the answers. If the applicant responds correctly, their identity is considered to be verified. For example, the Social Security Administration (SSA) uses this technique to verify the identities of individuals seeking access to the “My Social Security” service, which allows them to check the status of benefit applications, request a replacement Social Security or Medicare card, and request other services.However, data stolen in recent breaches, such as the 2017 Equifax breach, could be used fraudulently to respond to knowledge-based verification questions. The risk that an attacker could obtain and use an individual's personal information to answer knowledge-based verification questions and impersonate that individual led the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to issue guidance in 2017 that effectively prohibits agencies from using knowledge-based verification for sensitive applications. Alternative methods are available that provide stronger security, as shown in Figure 1. However, these methods may have limitations in cost, convenience, and technological maturity, and they may not be viable for all segments of the public.Figure 1: Examples of Alternative Identity Verification and Validation Methods that Federal Agencies Have Reported Using Two of the six agencies that GAO reviewed have eliminated knowledge-based verification. Specifically, the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently developed and began using alternative methods for remote identity proofing for their Login.gov and Get Transcript services that do not rely on knowledge-based verification. One agency—the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—has implemented alternative methods for part of its identity proofing process but still relies on knowledge-based verification for some individuals. SSA and the United States Postal Service (USPS) intend to reduce or eliminate their use of knowledge-based verification sometime in the future but do not yet have specific plans for doing so. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has no plans to reduce or eliminate knowledge-based verification for remote identity proofing.Several officials cited reasons for not adopting alternative methods, including high costs and implementation challenges for certain segments of the public. For example, mobile device verification may not always be viable because not all applicants possess mobile devices that can be used to verify their identities. Nevertheless, until these agencies take steps to eliminate their use of knowledge-based verification, the individuals they serve will remain at increased risk of identity fraud.NIST has issued guidance to agencies related to identity proofing and OMB has drafted identity management guidance, but their guidance is not sufficient to ensure agencies are adopting such methods. Sound practices in information technology (IT) management state that organizations should provide clear direction on how to implement IT objectives. However, NIST's guidance does not provide direction to agencies on how to successfully implement alternative identity-proofing methods with currently available technologies for all segments of the public. For example, the guidance does not discuss the advantages and limitations of currently available technologies or make recommendations to agencies on which technologies should be adopted. Further, most of the agencies that GAO reviewed reported that they were not able to implement the guidance because of limitations in available technologies for implementing alternative identify proofing methods. NIST officials stated that they believe their guidance is comprehensive, and at the time of our review they did not plan to issue supplemental implementation guidance to assist agencies.The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 ( FISMA) requires that OMB oversee federal agencies' information security practices. Although OMB has the authority under this statute to issue guidance, OMB has not issued guidance requiring agencies to report on their progress in implementing NIST's identity proofing guidance. OMB staff plan to issue guidance on identity management at federal agencies, but their proposed guidance does not require agencies to report on their progress in implementing NIST guidance. Until NIST provides additional guidance to help agencies move away from knowledge-based verification methods and OMB requires agencies to report on their progress, federal agencies will likely continue to struggle to strengthen their identify proofing processes. Many federal agencies rely on CRAs, such as Equifax, to help conduct remote identity proofing. The 2017 breach of data at Equifax raised concerns about federal agencies' remote identity proofing processes.GAO was asked to review federal agencies' remote identity proofing practices in light of the recent Equifax breach and the potential for fraud. The objectives of this review were to (1) describe federal practices for remote identity proofing and the risks associated with those practices, (2) assess federal agencies' actions to ensure the effectiveness of agencies' remote identity proofing processes, and (3) assess the sufficiency of federal identity proofing guidance.To do so, GAO identified remote identity proofing practices used by six agencies (CMS, GSA, IRS, SSA, USPS, and VA) with major, public-facing web applications providing public access to benefits or services. GAO compared the agencies' practices to NIST's remote identity proofing guidance to assess their effectiveness, and compared NIST's and OMB's guidance to requirements in federal law and best practices in IT management to assess the sufficiency of the guidance. GAO is making recommendations to six agencies to strengthen online identify verification processes: GAO recommends that CMS, SSA, USPS, and VA develop plans to strengthen their remote identity proofing processes by discontinuing knowledge-based verification. GAO recommends that NIST supplement its technical guidance with implementation guidance to assist agencies in adopting more secure remote identity proofing processes. GAO recommends that OMB issue guidance requiring federal agencies to report on their progress in adopting secure identity proofing practices.Four agencies—Commerce (on behalf of NIST), SSA, USPS, and VA—agreed with GAO's recommendations. These agencies outlined the additional steps they plan to take to improve the security of their remote identity proofing processes. One agency, HHS (on behalf of CMS), disagreed with GAO's recommendation because it did not believe that the available alternatives to knowledge-based verification were feasible for the individuals it serves. However, a variety of alternative methods exist, and GAO continues to believe CMS should develop a plan for discontinuing the use of knowledge-based verification. OMB provided a technical comment, which GAO incorporated, but OMB did not provide any comments on GAO's recommendation.For more information, contact Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., or Michael Clements at (202) 512-8678 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Federal law and guidance require that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the sensitive financial and taxpayer information that resides on its systems. However, taxpayer information held by third-party providers—such as paid tax return preparers and tax preparation software providers—generally falls outside of these requirements, according to IRS officials.In 2018, about 90 percent of individual taxpayers had their tax returns electronically filed by paid preparers or used tax preparation software to prepare and file their own returns.How Individual Tax Returns Were Filed, Calendar Year 2018IRS seeks to help safeguard electronic tax return filing for various types of third-party providers through requirements under its Authorized e-file Provider program. However, IRS’s efforts do not provide assurance that taxpayers’ information is being adequately protected. Paid Preparers. IRS has not developed minimum information security requirements for the systems used by paid preparers or Authorized e-file Providers. According to IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel, IRS does not have the explicit authority to regulate security for these systems. Instead, the Internal Revenue Code gives IRS broad authority to administer and supervise the internal revenue laws. The Department of the Treasury has previously requested additional authority to regulate the competency of all paid preparers; GAO has also suggested that Congress consider granting IRS this authority. Congress has not yet provided such authority. Neither the Department of the Treasury request nor the GAO suggestion included granting IRS authority to regulate the security of paid preparers’ systems. Having such authority would enable IRS to establish minimum requirements. Further, having explicit authority to establish security standards for Authorized e-file Providers’ systems may help IRS better ensure the protection of taxpayers’ information. Tax Software Providers. As part of a public-private partnership between IRS and the tax preparation industry, 15 tax software providers voluntarily adhere to a set of about 140 information security controls developed using guidance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). However, these controls are not required, and these providers represent only about one-third of all tax software providers. Additionally, IRS established six security, privacy, and business standards for providers of software that allows individuals to prepare their own tax returns (as opposed to software that paid preparers use). However, IRS has not substantially updated these standards since 2010, and they are, at least in part, outdated. For example, IRS cites an outdated encryption standard that NIST recommends not using due to its many known weaknesses.A key factor contributing to missed opportunities to address third-party cybersecurity is IRS’s lack of centralized leadership. Consequently, IRS is less able to ensure that third-party providers adequately protect taxpayers’ information, which may result in identity theft refund fraud.Example of Successful Identity Theft Refund Fraud AttemptIRS monitors compliance with its electronic tax return filing program requirements for those paid preparers who electronically file returns; however, IRS’s monitoring has a limited focus on cybersecurity issues. For example, the monitoring techniques largely focus on physical security (e.g., locked filing cabinets) rather than verifying that preparers have an information security policy consistent with NIST-recommended controls. Without effective monitoring of cybersecurity controls, IRS has limited assurance that those paid preparers’ systems have adequate controls in place to protect clients’ data.IRS recently began collecting information on high-risk security incidents, such as hackers infiltrating third-party provider systems. Reported incidents increased from 2017 to 2018, the only years for which IRS has data. However, IRS does not have a full picture of the scope of incidents because of inconsistent reporting requirements, including no reporting requirements for paid preparers.Reported High-Risk Security Incidents at Paid Preparers and Tax Software Providers, 2017 and 2018   2017 2018 Number of security incidents 212 336 Number of taxpayer accounts affected 180,557 211,162 GAO analysis of Internal Revenue Service data. | GAO-19-340 Third-party providers, such as paid tax return preparers and tax preparation software providers, greatly impact IRS’s administration of the tax system. If these third parties do not properly secure taxpayers’ personal and financial information, taxpayers will be vulnerable to identity theft refund fraud and their sensitive personal information will be at risk of unauthorized disclosure. IRS estimates that it paid out at least $110 million in identity theft tax refund fraud during 2017, and at least $1.6 billion in identity theft tax refund fraud during 2016.GAO was asked to review IRS’s efforts to track, monitor, and deter theft of taxpayer information from third parties. Among other things, this report assesses what is known about the taxpayer information security requirements for the systems used by third-party providers, IRS’s processes for monitoring compliance with these requirements, and IRS’s requirements for third-party security incident reporting.GAO analyzed IRS’s information security requirements, standards, and guidance for third-party providers and compared them to relevant laws, regulations, and leading practices, such as NIST guidance and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. GAO reviewed IRS’s monitoring procedures and its requirements and processes for third-party reporting of security incidents, and compared them to Internal Control Standards and GAO’s A Framework for Managing Fraud Risk in Federal Programs. GAO also interviewed IRS and tax industry group officials. GAO suggests that Congress consider providing IRS with explicit authority to establish security requirements for paid preparers’ and Authorized e-file Providers’ systems.GAO is also making eight recommendations, including that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Develop a governance structure or other form of centralized leadership to coordinate all aspects of IRS’s efforts to protect taxpayer information while at third-party providers. Require all tax software providers to adhere to prescribed information security controls. Regularly review and update security standards for tax software providers. Update IRS’s monitoring programs to include basic cybersecurity issues. Standardize incident reporting requirements for all types of third-party providers.IRS agreed with three recommendations, including the above recommendations to regularly review and update security standards for tax software providers, and standardize incident reporting requirements.IRS disagreed with five recommendations—including the other three listed above—generally citing the lack of clear and explicit authority it would need to establish security requirements for the information systems of paid preparers and Authorized e-file Providers. GAO believes that IRS can implement these recommendations without additional statutory authority.For more information, contact Jessica Lucas-Judy at 202-512-9110 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Original release date: May 2, 2019 | Last revised: May 3, 2019

Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is issuing this activity alert in response to recently disclosed exploits that target unsecure configurations of SAP components. [1]

Technical Details

A presentation at the April 2019 Operation for Community Development and Empowerment (OPCDE) cybersecurity conference describes SAP systems with unsecure configurations exposed to the internet. Typically, SAP systems are not intended to be exposed to the internet as it is an untrusted network. Malicious cyber actors can attack and compromise these unsecure systems with publicly available exploit tools, termed “10KBLAZE.” The presentation details the new exploit tools and reports on systems exposed to the internet.

SAP Gateway ACL

The SAP Gateway allows non-SAP applications to communicate with SAP applications. If SAP Gateway access control lists (ACLs) are not configured properly (e.g., gw/acl_mode = 0), anonymous users can run operating system (OS) commands.[2] According to the OPCDE presentation, about 900 U.S. internet-facing systems were detected in this vulnerable condition.

SAP Router secinfo

The SAP router is a program that helps connect SAP systems with external networks. The default secinfo configuration for a SAP Gateway allows any internal host to run OS commands anonymously. If an attacker can access a misconfigured SAP router, the router can act as an internal host and proxy the attacker’s requests, which may result in remote code execution.

According to the OPCDE presentation, 1,181 SAP routers were exposed to the internet. It is unclear if the exposed systems were confirmed to be vulnerable or were simply running the SAP router service.

Original release date: May 2, 2019 | Last revised: May 3, 2019

Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is issuing this activity alert in response to recently disclosed exploits that target unsecure configurations of SAP components. [1]

Technical Details

A presentation at the April 2019 Operation for Community Development and Empowerment (OPCDE) cybersecurity conference describes SAP systems with unsecure configurations exposed to the internet. Typically, SAP systems are not intended to be exposed to the internet as it is an untrusted network. Malicious cyber actors can attack and compromise these unsecure systems with publicly available exploit tools, termed “10KBLAZE.” The presentation details the new exploit tools and reports on systems exposed to the internet.

SAP Gateway ACL

The SAP Gateway allows non-SAP applications to communicate with SAP applications. If SAP Gateway access control lists (ACLs) are not configured properly (e.g., gw/acl_mode = 0), anonymous users can run operating system (OS) commands.[2] According to the OPCDE presentation, about 900 U.S. internet-facing systems were detected in this vulnerable condition.

SAP Router secinfo

The SAP router is a program that helps connect SAP systems with external networks. The default secinfo configuration for a SAP Gateway allows any internal host to run OS commands anonymously. If an attacker can access a misconfigured SAP router, the router can act as an internal host and proxy the attacker’s requests, which may result in remote code execution.

According to the OPCDE presentation, 1,181 SAP routers were exposed to the internet. It is unclear if the exposed systems were confirmed to be vulnerable or were simply running the SAP router service.

What GAO Found Of six important leading practices for effective business process reengineering and information technology (IT) requirements management, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) fully implemented four and partially implemented two for the Grants Management Modernization (GMM) program (see table). Specifically, FEMA ensured senior leadership commitment, took steps to assess its business environment and performance goals, took recent actions to track progress in delivering IT requirements, and incorporated input from end user stakeholders. However, FEMA has not yet fully established plans for implementing new business processes or established complete traceability of IT requirements. Extent to Which the Federal Emergency Management Agency Implemented Selected Leading Practices for Business Process Reengineering and Information Technology (IT) Requirements Management for the Grants Management Modernization Program Leading practice Overall area rating Ensure executive leadership support for process reengineering ● Assess the current and target business environment and business performance goals ● Establish plans for implementing new business processes ◑ Establish clear, prioritized, and traceable IT requirements ◑ Track progress in delivering IT requirements ● Incorporate input from end user stakeholders ● Legend: ●=Fully implemented, ◑=Partially implemented, ○=Not implemented. Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency documentation. | GAO-19-164 Until FEMA fully implements the remaining two practices, it risks delivering an IT solution that does not fully modernize FEMA's grants management systems. While GMM's initial May 2017 cost estimate of about $251 million was generally consistent with leading practices for a reliable, high-quality estimate, it no longer reflects current assumptions about the program. FEMA officials stated in December 2018 that they had completed a revised cost estimate, but it was undergoing departmental approval. GMM's program schedule was inconsistent with leading practices; of particular concern was that the program's final delivery date of September 2020 was not informed by a realistic assessment of GMM development activities, and rather was determined by imposing an unsubstantiated delivery date. Developing sound cost and schedule estimates is necessary to ensure that FEMA has a clear understanding of program risks. Of five key cybersecurity practices, FEMA fully addressed three and partially addressed two for GMM. Specifically, it categorized GMM's system based on security risk, selected and implemented security controls, and monitored security controls on an ongoing basis. However, the program had not initially established corrective action plans for 13 medium- and low-risk vulnerabilities. This conflicts with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance that specifies that corrective action plans must be developed for every weakness identified. Until FEMA, among other things, ensures that the program consistently follows the department's guidance on preparing corrective action plans for all security vulnerabilities, GMM's system will remain at increased risk of exploits. Why GAO Did This Study FEMA, a component of DHS, annually awards billions of dollars in grants to help communities prepare for, mitigate the effects of, and recover from major disasters. However, FEMA's complex IT environment supporting grants management consists of many disparate systems. In 2008, the agency attempted to modernize these systems but experienced significant challenges. In 2015, FEMA initiated a new endeavor (the GMM program) aimed at streamlining and modernizing the grants management IT environment. GAO was asked to review the GMM program. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which FEMA is implementing leading practices for reengineering its grants management processes and incorporating needs into IT requirements; (2) assess the reliability of the program's estimated costs and schedule; and (3) determine the extent to which FEMA is addressing key cybersecurity practices. GAO compared program documentation to leading practices for process reengineering and requirements management, cost and schedule estimation, and cybersecurity risk management, as established by the Software Engineering Institute, National Institute of Standards and Technology, and GAO. What GAO Recommends GAO is making eight recommendations to FEMA to implement leading practices related to reengineering processes, managing requirements, scheduling, and implementing cybersecurity. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them. For more information, contact Carol C. Harris at (202) 512-4456 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

What GAO Found No one solution can address the range of potential risks from a data breach, according to interviews with academic, consumer, government, and industry experts and documentation GAO reviewed. Perpetrators of fraud can use stolen personal information—such as account numbers, passwords, or Social Security numbers—to take out loans or seek medical care under someone else's name, or make unauthorized purchases on credit cards, among other crimes. Foreign state-based actors can use personal information to support espionage or other nefarious uses. Public and private entities that experience a breach sometimes provide complimentary commercial identity theft services to affected individuals to help monitor their credit accounts or restore their identities in cases of identity theft, among other features. Consumers also may purchase the services. As of November 30, 2018, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had obligated about $421 million for a suite of credit and identity monitoring, insurance, and identity restoration services to offer to the approximately 22 million individuals affected by its 2015 data breaches. As of September 30, 2018, about 3 million had used the services and approximately 61 individuals had received payouts from insurance claims, for an average of $1,800 per claim. OPM re-competed and awarded a contract to the previously contracted company in December 2018. GAO's review did not identify any studies that analyzed whether consumers who sign up for or purchase identity theft services were less subject to identity theft or detected financial or other fraud more or less quickly than those who monitored their own accounts for free. A few experts said consumers could sign up for such services if offered for free. Credit monitoring may be convenient for consumers and personalized restoration services may help identity theft victims recover their identities, but such services do not prevent fraud from happening in the first place. The services also do not prevent or directly address risks of nonfinancial harm such as medical identity theft. Consumer, government, and industry experts highlighted other free options, including a credit freeze, which prevents one type of fraud. A freeze restricts businesses from accessing a person's credit report—and can prevent the illicit opening of a new account or loan in the person's name. A provision of federal law that took effect in September 2018 made it free for consumers to place or lift credit freezes quickly at the three nationwide consumer reporting agencies (Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion). Consumers also can regularly monitor their accounts and review their credit reports for free every 12 months. In addition, they can take advantage of free federal assistance such as the guidance on the Federal Trade Commission's IdentityTheft.gov website. Finally, large amounts of personal information are outside of consumers' control and bad actors can use stolen information for years after a breach. Therefore, experts noted that data security at entities that hold such information—and efforts to make stolen information less useful for identity thieves, through use of new identity verification technologies, for example—are important ways to mitigate risks of harm for consumers. Why GAO Did This Study Recent large-scale data breaches of public and private entities have put hundreds of millions of people at risk of identity theft or other harm. GAO was asked to review issues related to consumers' options to address risks of harm from data breaches. This report, among other things, examines information and expert views on the effectiveness of consumer options to address data breach risks. GAO analyzed available data on options, collected and analyzed related documentation, conducted a literature review of studies, and interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 35 experts (from academia, government entities, consumer and industry organizations) and identity theft service providers to reflect a range of views. What GAO Recommends GAO reiterates a matter for congressional consideration and a recommendation from its 2017 report on identity theft services (GAO-17-254). In that report, GAO found that legislation requiring federal agencies that experience data breaches, including OPM, to offer certain levels of identity theft insurance coverage to affected individuals requires coverage levels that are likely unnecessary. Therefore, Congress should consider permitting agencies to determine the appropriate coverage level for such insurance. GAO also recommended the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) update its guidance for agency responses to data breaches, after analyzing the effectiveness of identity theft services relative to lower-cost alternatives. OMB did not agree or disagree and had not taken action as of early March 2019. For more information, contact Anna Maria Ortiz at (202) 512-8678 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

What GAO Found The 24 reviewed federal agencies generally assigned work roles to filled and vacant positions that performed information technology (IT), cybersecurity, or cyber-related functions as required by the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 (the act). However, six of the 24 agencies reported that they had not completed assigning the associated work role codes to their vacant positions, although they were required to do so by April 2018. In addition, most agencies had likely miscategorized the work roles of many positions. Specifically, 22 of the 24 agencies assigned a “non-IT” work role code to 15,779 (about 19 percent) of their IT positions within the 2210 occupational series. Further, the six agencies that GAO selected for additional review had assigned work role codes that were not consistent with the work roles and duties described in corresponding position descriptions for 63 of 120 positions within the 2210 occupational series that GAO examined (see figure). Consistency of Assigned Work Role Codes with Position Descriptions for Random Sample of IT Positions Within the 2210 Occupational Series at Six Selected Agencies Human resource and IT officials from the 24 agencies generally reported that they had not completely or accurately categorized work roles for IT positions within the 2210 occupational series, in part, because they may have assigned the associated codes in error or had not completed validating the accuracy of the assigned codes. By assigning work roles that are inconsistent with the IT, cybersecurity, and cyber-related positions, the agencies are diminishing the reliability of the information they need to improve workforce planning. The act also required agencies to identify work roles of critical need by April 2019. To aid agencies with identifying their critical needs, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) developed guidance and required agencies to provide a preliminary report by August 2018. The 24 agencies have begun to identify critical needs and submitted a preliminary report to OPM that identified information systems security manager, IT project manager, and systems security analyst as the top three work roles of critical need. Nevertheless, until agencies accurately categorize their positions, their ability to effectively identify critical staffing needs will be impaired. Why GAO Did This Study A key component of mitigating and responding to cyber threats is having a qualified, well-trained cybersecurity workforce. The act requires OPM and federal agencies to take several actions related to cybersecurity workforce planning. These actions include categorizing all IT, cybersecurity, and cyber-related positions using OPM personnel codes for specific work roles, and identifying critical staffing needs. The act contains a provision for GAO to analyze and monitor agencies' workforce planning. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which federal agencies have assigned work roles for positions performing IT, cybersecurity, or cyber-related functions and (2) describe the steps federal agencies took to identify work roles of critical need. GAO administered a questionnaire to 24 agencies, analyzed coding data from personnel systems, and examined preliminary reports on critical needs. GAO selected six of the 24 agencies based on cybersecurity spending levels to determine the accuracy of codes assigned to a random sample of IT positions. GAO also interviewed relevant OPM and agency officials. What GAO Recommends GAO is making 28 recommendations to 22 agencies to review and assign the appropriate codes to their IT, cybersecurity, and cyber-related positions. Of the 22 agencies to which GAO made recommendations, 20 agreed with the recommendations, one partially agreed, and one did not agree with one of two recommendations. GAO continues to believe that all of the recommendations are warranted. For more information, contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

What GAO Found The United States does not have a comprehensive Internet privacy law governing the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of consumers' personal information. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy, using its statutory authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. However, to date FTC has not issued regulations for Internet privacy other than those protecting financial privacy and the Internet privacy of children, which were required by law. For FTC Act violations, FTC may promulgate regulations but is required to use procedures that differ from traditional notice-and-comment processes and that FTC staff said add time and complexity. In the last decade, FTC has filed 101 enforcement actions regarding Internet privacy; nearly all actions resulted in settlement agreements requiring action by the companies. In most of these cases, FTC did not levy civil penalties because it lacked such authority for those particular violations. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has had a limited role in overseeing Internet privacy. From 2015 to 2017, FCC asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet service providers. In 2016, FCC promulgated privacy rules for Internet service providers that Congress later repealed. FTC resumed privacy oversight of Internet service providers in June 2018. Stakeholders GAO interviewed had varied views on the current Internet privacy enforcement approach and how it could be enhanced. Most Internet industry stakeholders said they favored FTC's current approach—direct enforcement of its unfair and deceptive practices statutory authority, rather than promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that authority. These stakeholders said that the current approach allows for flexibility and that regulations could hinder innovation. Other stakeholders, including consumer advocates and most former FTC and FCC commissioners GAO interviewed, favored having FTC issue and enforce regulations. Some stakeholders said a new data-protection agency was needed to oversee consumer privacy. Stakeholders identified three main areas in which Internet privacy oversight could be enhanced: Statute. Some stakeholders told GAO that an overarching Internet privacy statute could enhance consumer protection by clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and agencies what behaviors are prohibited. Rulemaking. Some stakeholders said that regulations can provide clarity, enforcement fairness, and flexibility. Officials from two other consumer protection agencies said their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight efforts and works together with enforcement actions. Civil penalty authority. Some stakeholders said FTC's Internet privacy enforcement could be more effective with authority to levy civil penalties for first-time violations of the FTC Act. Comprehensive Internet privacy legislation that establishes specific standards and includes traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking and broader civil penalty authority could enhance the federal government's ability to protect consumer privacy. Why GAO Did This Study This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's January 2019 report, entitled Internet Privacy: Additional Federal Authority Could Enhance Consumer Protection and Provide Flexibility (GAO-19-52). For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..  

Original release date: January 24, 2019 | Last revised: February 13, 2019

Summary

The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), part of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), is aware of a global Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure hijacking campaign. Using compromised credentials, an attacker can modify the location to which an organization’s domain name resources resolve. This enables the attacker to redirect user traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure and obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization’s domain names, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.

See the following links for downloadable copies of open-source indicators of compromise (IOCs) from the sources listed in the References section below:

IOCs (.csv)IOCs (.stix)

Note: these files were last updated February 13, 2019, to remove the following three non-malicious IP addresses:

107.161.23.204192.161.187.200209.141.38.71

Technical Details

Using the following techniques, attackers have redirected and intercepted web and mail traffic, and could do so for other networked services.

The attacker begins by compromising user credentials, or obtaining them through alternate means, of an account that can make changes to DNS records.Next, the attacker alters DNS records, like Address (A), Mail Exchanger (MX), or Name Server (NS) records, replacing the legitimate address of a service with an address the attacker controls. This enables them to direct user traffic to their own infrastructure for manipulation or inspection before passing it on to the legitimate service, should they choose. This creates a risk that persists beyond the period of traffic redirection.Because the attacker can set DNS record values, they can also obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization’s domain names. This allows the redirected traffic to be decrypted, exposing any user-submitted data. Since the certificate is valid for the domain, end users receive no error warnings.

Mitigations

NCCIC recommends the following best practices to help safeguard networks against this threat:

Original release date: January 24, 2019 | Last revised: February 13, 2019

Summary

The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), part of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), is aware of a global Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure hijacking campaign. Using compromised credentials, an attacker can modify the location to which an organization’s domain name resources resolve. This enables the attacker to redirect user traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure and obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization’s domain names, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.

See the following links for downloadable copies of open-source indicators of compromise (IOCs) from the sources listed in the References section below:

IOCs (.csv)IOCs (.stix)

Note: these files were last updated February 13, 2019, to remove the following three non-malicious IP addresses:

107.161.23.204192.161.187.200209.141.38.71

Technical Details

Using the following techniques, attackers have redirected and intercepted web and mail traffic, and could do so for other networked services.

The attacker begins by compromising user credentials, or obtaining them through alternate means, of an account that can make changes to DNS records.Next, the attacker alters DNS records, like Address (A), Mail Exchanger (MX), or Name Server (NS) records, replacing the legitimate address of a service with an address the attacker controls. This enables them to direct user traffic to their own infrastructure for manipulation or inspection before passing it on to the legitimate service, should they choose. This creates a risk that persists beyond the period of traffic redirection.Because the attacker can set DNS record values, they can also obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization’s domain names. This allows the redirected traffic to be decrypted, exposing any user-submitted data. Since the certificate is valid for the domain, end users receive no error warnings.

Mitigations

NCCIC recommends the following best practices to help safeguard networks against this threat:

What GAO Found As GAO reported in June 2018, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) implemented technical controls and an information security program that were intended to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. However, GAO identified control and program deficiencies in the core security functions related to identifying risk, protecting systems from threats and vulnerabilities, detecting and responding to cyber security events, and recovering system operations (see table below). GAO made 195 recommendations to address these deficiencies. Number of GAO-Identified Technical Control and Information Security Program Deficiencies at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Associated Recommendations by Core Security Function   Core security function Number of technical control deficiencies Number of technical control recommendations Number of information security program deficiencies Number of information security program recommendations Identify 0 0 5 5 Protect 85 161 1 1 Detect 8 18 3 3 Respond 1 5 1 1 Recover 0 0 1 1 Total 94 184 11 11 Source: GAO. | GAO-19-70 As of August 2018, CDC had made significant progress in resolving many of the security deficiencies by implementing 102 of 184 (about 55 percent) technical control recommendations, and partially implementing 1 of 11 information security program recommendations made in the June 2018 report. The figure shows the status of CDC's efforts to implement the 195 recommendations. Status of GAO Recommendations to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Additionally, CDC has created remedial action plans to implement the majority of the remaining open recommendations by September 2019. Until CDC implements these recommendations and resolves the associated deficiencies, its information systems and information will remain at increased risk of misuse, improper disclosure or modification, and destruction. Why GAO Did This Study CDC is responsible for detecting and responding to emerging health threats and controlling dangerous substances. In carrying out its mission, CDC relies on information technology systems to receive, process, and maintain sensitive data. Accordingly, effective information security controls are essential to ensure that the agency's systems and information are protected from misuse and modification. GAO was asked to examine information security at CDC. In June 2018, GAO issued a limited official use only report on the extent to which CDC had effectively implemented technical controls and an information security program to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information on selected information systems. This current report is a public version of the June 2018 report. In addition, for this public report, GAO determined the extent to which CDC has taken corrective actions to address the previously identified security program and technical control deficiencies and related recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO reviewed supporting documents regarding CDC's actions on previously identified recommendations and interviewed personnel at CDC. For more information, contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., or Dr. Nabajyoti Barkakati at (202) 512-4499 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Original release date: December 3, 2018

Summary

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are issuing this activity alert to inform computer network defenders about SamSam ransomware, also known as MSIL/Samas.A. Specifically, this product shares analysis of vulnerabilities that cyber actors exploited to deploy this ransomware. In addition, this report provides recommendations for prevention and mitigation.

The SamSam actors targeted multiple industries, including some within critical infrastructure. Victims were located predominately in the United States, but also internationally. Network-wide infections against organizations are far more likely to garner large ransom payments than infections of individual systems. Organizations that provide essential functions have a critical need to resume operations quickly and are more likely to pay larger ransoms.

The actors exploit Windows servers to gain persistent access to a victim’s network and infect all reachable hosts. According to reporting from victims in early 2016, cyber actors used the JexBoss Exploit Kit to access vulnerable JBoss applications. Since mid-2016, FBI analysis of victims’ machines indicates that cyber actors use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain persistent access to victims’ networks. Typically, actors either use brute force attacks or stolen login credentials. Detecting RDP intrusions can be challenging because the malware enters through an approved access point.

After gaining access to a particular network, the SamSam actors escalate privileges for administrator rights, drop malware onto the server, and run an executable file, all without victims’ action or authorization. While many ransomware campaigns rely on a victim completing an action, such as opening an email or visiting a compromised website, RDP allows cyber actors to infect victims with minimal detection.

Analysis of tools found on victims’ networks indicated that successful cyber actors purchased several of the stolen RDP credentials from known darknet marketplaces. FBI analysis of victims’ access logs revealed that the SamSam actors can infect a network within hours of purchasing the credentials. While remediating infected systems, several victims found suspicious activity on their networks unrelated to SamSam. This activity is a possible indicator that the victims’ credentials were stolen, sold on the darknet, and used for other illegal activity.

Original release date: December 3, 2018

Summary

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are issuing this activity alert to inform computer network defenders about SamSam ransomware, also known as MSIL/Samas.A. Specifically, this product shares analysis of vulnerabilities that cyber actors exploited to deploy this ransomware. In addition, this report provides recommendations for prevention and mitigation.

The SamSam actors targeted multiple industries, including some within critical infrastructure. Victims were located predominately in the United States, but also internationally. Network-wide infections against organizations are far more likely to garner large ransom payments than infections of individual systems. Organizations that provide essential functions have a critical need to resume operations quickly and are more likely to pay larger ransoms.

The actors exploit Windows servers to gain persistent access to a victim’s network and infect all reachable hosts. According to reporting from victims in early 2016, cyber actors used the JexBoss Exploit Kit to access vulnerable JBoss applications. Since mid-2016, FBI analysis of victims’ machines indicates that cyber actors use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain persistent access to victims’ networks. Typically, actors either use brute force attacks or stolen login credentials. Detecting RDP intrusions can be challenging because the malware enters through an approved access point.

After gaining access to a particular network, the SamSam actors escalate privileges for administrator rights, drop malware onto the server, and run an executable file, all without victims’ action or authorization. While many ransomware campaigns rely on a victim completing an action, such as opening an email or visiting a compromised website, RDP allows cyber actors to infect victims with minimal detection.

Analysis of tools found on victims’ networks indicated that successful cyber actors purchased several of the stolen RDP credentials from known darknet marketplaces. FBI analysis of victims’ access logs revealed that the SamSam actors can infect a network within hours of purchasing the credentials. While remediating infected systems, several victims found suspicious activity on their networks unrelated to SamSam. This activity is a possible indicator that the victims’ credentials were stolen, sold on the darknet, and used for other illegal activity.

Original release date: November 27, 2018

Systems Affected

Microsoft Windows

Overview

This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). DHS and FBI are releasing this TA to provide information about a major online ad fraud operation—referred to by the U.S. Government as "3ve"—involving the control of over 1.7 million unique Internet Protocol (IP) addresses globally, when sampled over a 10-day window.

Description

Online advertisers desire premium websites on which to publish their ads and large numbers of visitors to view those ads. 3ve created fake versions of both (websites and visitors), and funneled the advertising revenue to cyber criminals. 3ve obtained control over 1.7 million unique IPs by leveraging victim computers infected with Boaxxe/Miuref and Kovter malware, as well as Border Gateway Protocol-hijacked IP addresses. 

Boaxxe/Miuref Malware

Boaxxe malware is spread through email attachments and drive-by downloads. The ad fraud scheme that utilizes the Boaxxe botnet is primarily located in a data center. Hundreds of machines in this data center are browsing to counterfeit websites. When these counterfeit webpages are loaded into a browser, requests are made for ads to be placed on these pages. The machines in the data center use the Boaxxe botnet as a proxy to make requests for these ads. A command and control (C2) server sends instructions to the infected botnet computers to make the ad requests in an effort to hide their true data center IPs.

Kovter Malware

Kovter malware is also spread through email attachments and drive-by downloads. The ad fraud scheme that utilizes the Kovter botnet runs a hidden Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) browser on the infected machine that the user cannot see. A C2 server tells the infected machine to visit counterfeit websites. When the counterfeit webpage is loaded in the hidden browser, requests are made for ads to be placed on these counterfeit pages. The infected machine receives the ads and loads them into the hidden browser.

Original release date: November 27, 2018

Systems Affected

Microsoft Windows

Overview

This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). DHS and FBI are releasing this TA to provide information about a major online ad fraud operation—referred to by the U.S. Government as "3ve"—involving the control of over 1.7 million unique Internet Protocol (IP) addresses globally, when sampled over a 10-day window.

Description

Online advertisers desire premium websites on which to publish their ads and large numbers of visitors to view those ads. 3ve created fake versions of both (websites and visitors), and funneled the advertising revenue to cyber criminals. 3ve obtained control over 1.7 million unique IPs by leveraging victim computers infected with Boaxxe/Miuref and Kovter malware, as well as Border Gateway Protocol-hijacked IP addresses. 

Boaxxe/Miuref Malware

Boaxxe malware is spread through email attachments and drive-by downloads. The ad fraud scheme that utilizes the Boaxxe botnet is primarily located in a data center. Hundreds of machines in this data center are browsing to counterfeit websites. When these counterfeit webpages are loaded into a browser, requests are made for ads to be placed on these pages. The machines in the data center use the Boaxxe botnet as a proxy to make requests for these ads. A command and control (C2) server sends instructions to the infected botnet computers to make the ad requests in an effort to hide their true data center IPs.

Kovter Malware

Kovter malware is also spread through email attachments and drive-by downloads. The ad fraud scheme that utilizes the Kovter botnet runs a hidden Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) browser on the infected machine that the user cannot see. A C2 server tells the infected machine to visit counterfeit websites. When the counterfeit webpage is loaded in the hidden browser, requests are made for ads to be placed on these counterfeit pages. The infected machine receives the ads and loads them into the hidden browser.